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Speedy reflects to herself. "This report is a start, but it does not tell me how poor PROSCOL participants are and what impact the program has on schooling. I need hard data." Later Speedy prepares a notes on alternative data sources (Appendix).
There is a promising lead in the MSD file. Nine months ago the first national household survey of Labas was done by the Labas Bureau of Statistics (LBS). It is called the Living Standards Survey (LSS). The survey was done for a random sample of 10,000 households, and it asked about household incomes by source, employment, expenditures, health status, education attainments, and demographic and other attributes of the family. There is a letter in the file from MSD to LBS, a few months prior to the LSS, asking for a question to be added on whether or not the sampled household had participated in PROSCOL. The reply from LBS indicates that the listing of income sources in the survey schedule will include a line item for money received from PROSCOL.
"Wow", says Speedy, and she heads off to LBS.
Speedy Analyst already knows a few things about the LSS, having used tabulations from it produced by LBS. But Speedy worries that she will not be able to do a good evaluation of PROSCOL without access to the raw household-level data. After a formal request from the Minister (which Speedy wrote for him to sign), the Secretary of Statistics agrees to give her the complete micro data from the LSS.
Speedy already knows how to use a statistics package called SAPS. After a long and painful day figuring out how to use the raw LSS data, Speedy starts the real work. She uses SAPS to make a cross-tab of the average amount received from PROSCOL by deciles of households, where the deciles are formed by ranking all households in the sample according to their income per person. In calculating the latter, Speedy decides to subtract any monies received from PROSCOL; this, she reckons, will be a good measure of income in the absence of the program. So she hopes to reveal who gained according to their pre-intervention income.
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The cross-tab suggests that the cash transfers under the program are quite well targeted to the poor. By the official LBS poverty line, about 30% of Northwest Labas' population is poor. From her table, she calculates that the poorest 30% of the LSS sample receive 70% of the PROSCOL transfers.
This looks like good news for PROSCOL, Speedy reflects.
What about the impact on schooling? She makes another table, giving average school enrollment rates of various age groups for PROSCOL families versus non-PROSCOL families. This suggests almost no difference between the two; the average enrollment rate for kids aged 6-18 is about 80% in both cases.
Speedy then calculates average years of schooling at each age and plots the results separately for PROSCOL families and non-PROSCOL families. The two figures are not identical, but they are very close. This assumes that the non-participants correctly reveal, at least on average, schooling without the program. Some simple algebra might help make this clear."
Mr. Statistica starts writing. "Let P i denote PROSCOL participation of the i'th child. This can take two possible values, namely P i =1 when the child participates in PROSCOL and P i =0 when she does not. When the i'th child does not participate, her level of schooling is S 0i which stands for child i's schooling S when P=0. When the child does participate her schooling is S 1i . The expected gain in schooling due to PROSCOL for a child that does in fact participate is:
This is the conditional mean impact, conditional on participating in the program. In the evaluation literature, E(S 1i -S 0i │P i =1) is sometimes called the 'treatment effect' or the 'average treatment effect on the treated'." Speedy thinks to herself that the government would not like to call PROSCOL a "treatment". families. This is the sample estimate of:
There is a simple identity linking the D and G, namely:
D = G + B
This term 'B' is the bias in your estimate, and it is given by:
In other words, the bias is the expected difference in schooling without PROSCOL between children who did in fact participate in the program and those who did not. You could correct for this bias if you knew E(S 0i │P i =1). But you can't even get a sample estimate of that. You can't observe what the schooling would have been of kids who actually participated in PROSCOL had they not participated; that is missing data -it is called a 'counter-factual' mean." Speedy sees that Statistica has a legitimate concern. In the absence of the program, PROSCOL parents may well send their kids to school less than do other parents. If so, then there will be a bias in her calculation. What the Finance Minister needs to know is the extra schooling due to PROSCOL. Presumably this only affects those families who actually participate. So the Minister needs to know how much less schooling could be expected without the program. If there is no bias, then the extra schooling under the program is the difference in mean schooling between those who participated and those who did not. So the bias arises if there is a difference in mean schooling between PROSCOL parents and non-PROSCOL in the absence of the program.
"What can be done to get rid of this bias, Mr. Statistica?" "Well, in theory at least the best way is to assign the program randomly. Then participants and non-participants will have the same expected schooling in the absence of the program, i.e., E(S 0i │P i =1) = E(S 0i │P i =0). The schooling of non-participating families will then correctly reveal the counter-factual, i.e., the schooling that we would have observed for participants had they not had access to the program. Indeed, random assignment will equate the whole distribution, not just the means. There will still be a bias due to sampling error, but for large enough samples you can safely assume that any statistically significant difference in the distribution of schooling between participants and non-participants is due to the program." "Why did you say 'in theory at least'?" "Well, no method is perfect. Randomization can be fraught with problems in practice.
Political feasibility is often a problem. And even when selection is randomized, there can still be 8 selective non-participation. There is a volume by Manski and Garfinkel that I have somewhere that includes some interesting papers on the potential problems; I will lend you my copy. But the key point is to recognize the ways in which program placement is not in fact random."
On recalling what she read in the PROSCOL file, Speedy realizes that she need look no further than the design of the program to see that participation is not random. Indeed, it would be a serious criticism of PROSCOL to find that it was. The very fact of its purposive targeting to poor families, who are presumably less likely to send their kids to school, would create bias.
She tells Mr. Statistica about the program's purposive placement.
"So, Speedy, if PROSCOL is working well then you should expect participants to have worse schooling in the absence of the program. Then E(S 0i │P i =1) < E(S 0i │P i =0) and your calculation will underestimate the gain from the program. You may find little or no benefit even though the program is actually working well." Speedy returns to her office, despondent. She sees now that the magnitude of this bias that Mr. Statistica is worried about could be huge. Her reasoning is as follows: Suppose that poor families send their kids to work rather than school; because they are poor and cannot borrow easily, they need the extra cash now. Non-poor families send their kids to school. The program selects poor families, who then send their kids to school. One observes negligible difference in mean schooling between PROSCOL families and non-PROSCOL families; indeed, E(S 1i │P i =1) = E(S 0 i │P i =0) in expectation. But the impact of the program is positive, and is given by E(S 1i
which equals E(S 0i │P i =0) -E(S 0i │P i =1) in this case. The failure to take account of the program's purposive, pro-poor, targeting could well have led to a very substantial under-estimation of PROSCOL's benefits from her comparison of mean schooling between PROSCOL families and non-PROSCOL families.
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A visit to Ms Tangential Economiste
Next Speedy visits a colleague at the Ministry of Finance, Tangential Economiste. Tangential specializes in public finance. She has a reputation as a sharp economist in the Ministry, though sometimes a little brutal in her comments on her colleagues' work.
Speedy first shows her the cross-tab of amounts received from PROSCOL against income.
Tangential immediately brings up a concern, which she chastises Speedy for ignoring. "You have clearly overestimated the gains to the poor from PROSCOL because you have ignored foregone income, Speedy. Kids have to go to school if the family is to get the PROSCOL transfer. So they will not be able to work, either on the family business or in the labor market. Kids aged 15-18 can earn two-thirds or more of the adult wage in agriculture and construction, for example. PROSCOL families will lose this income from their kids' work. You should take account of this foregone income when you calculate the net income gains from the program. And you should subtract this net income gain, not the gross transfer, to work out pre-intervention income. Only then will you know how poor the family would have been in the absence of the PROSCOL transfer. I reckon this table might greatly overstate the program's gains to the poor." "But why should I factor out the foregone income from child labor? Less child labor is surely a good thing," Speedy says in defense.
"You should certainly look at the gains from reducing child labor Speedy, of which the main gain is no doubt the extra schooling, and hence higher future incomes of currently poor families. I see your next table is about that. As I see it, you are concerned with the two main ways PROSCOL reduces poverty: one is by increasing the current incomes of the poor, and the other is by increasing their future incomes. The impact on child labor matters to both, but in opposite directions. So PROSCOL faces a trade off." 10 Speedy realizes that this is another reason why she needs to get a good estimate of the impact on schooling; only then will she be able to determine the foregone income that Tangential is so worried about. Maybe the extra time at school comes out of non-work time.
Next, Speedy tells Tangential about Mr. Statistica's concerns about her second table, to see what she thinks.
"I think your main problem here is that you have not allowed for all the other determinants of schooling, besides participation in PROSCOL. You should run a regression of years of schooling on a set of control variables as well as whether or not the child's family was covered by PROSCOL.
Why not try this regression?" Tangential writes. "For the i'th child in your sample let:
Here a, b and c are parameters, X stands for the control variables, such as age of the child, mother's and father's education, the size and demographic composition of the household and school characteristics, while ε is a residual that includes other determinants of schooling, and measurement errors. If the family of the i'th child participates in PROSCOL (P=1) then its schooling will be a + b + cX i + ε i . If it does not participate then its schooling will be a + cX i + ε i . The difference between the two is the gain in schooling due to the program, which is just b."
This discussion puts Speedy in a more hopeful mood, as she returns to her office to try out Tangential's equation. She runs the REGRESS command in SAPS on the regression with and without the control variables Tangential suggested. When she runs it without them, she finds that the estimated value of b is not significantly different from zero (using the standard t-test given by SAPS).
This looks suspiciously like the result she first got, taking the difference in means between participants and nonparticipants -suggesting that PROSCOL is not having any impact on schooling. However, when she puts in the control variables suggested by Tangential, she immediately sees a positive and significant coefficient on PROSCOL participation. She calculates that by 18 years of age, the program has added two years to schooling.
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Speedy thinks that this is starting to look more convincing. But she feels a little unsure about what she is doing. "Why do these control variables make such a difference? And have I used the right controls? I need more help if I am going to figure out what exactly is going on here, and whether I should believe this regression."
Professor Chisquare helps interpret Speedy's results
Speedy decides to visit Professor Chisquare, who was one of her teachers at LNU. Chisquare is a funny little man, who wears old-fashioned suits and ties that don't match too often. "It is just not normal to be so square", she recalls thinking during his classes in econometrics. Speedy also recalls her dread at asking Chisquare anything, because his answers were sometimes very hard to understand. "But he knows more about regressions than anyone else I know", Speedy reflects.
She arranges a meeting. Having heard on the phone what her problem is, Chisquare greets his ex-student with a long list of papers to read, mostly with rather impenetrable titles, and published in seemingly obscure places. (His reading list is included in the references.) "Thanks very much Professor, but I don't think I will have time to read all this before my report is due. Can I tell you my problem, and get your reactions now?" Chisquare agrees. Speedy shows him Tangential's equations and the estimated regressions, thinking that he will be pleased that his ex-student has been running regressions. He asks her a few questions about what she had done, and then rests back in his chair, ready, it seems, to pronounce judgement on her efforts so far.
"One concern I have with your regression of schooling on P and X is that it does not allow the impact of the program to vary with X; the impact is the same for everyone, which does not seem very likely." 12 "Yes, I wondered about that," chips in Speedy. "Parents with more schooling would be more likely to send their kids to school, but this effect may well be more pronounced amongst the poor, so that the impact of PROSCOL will be higher among more educated families." "Quite possibly, Ms Analyst. To allow the gains to vary with X, let mean schooling of nonparticipants be a 0 + c 0 X i while that of participants is a 1 + c 1 X i , so the observed level of schooling is:
where ε 0 and ε 1 are random errors, each with a mean of zero and uncorrelated with X. To estimate this model, all you have to do is add an extra term for the interaction effects between program participation and observed characteristics to the regression you have already run. So the augmented regression is:
is the mean program impact at any given value of X. Notice that you have something you don't know here, E(ε 1i -ε 0i │P i , X i ), which captures any differences in the unobserved variables that influence the schooling of participants, with and without the program. Under the assumption that the unobserved factors are the same on average amongst participants with and without the program (which is what Ms Economist implicitly assumed), you can get an estimate of mean impact just by plugging the same mean X into this formula. If c 1 = c 0 then you get your previous specification in which b=a 1 -a 0 is the mean impact.
"A second concern Ms Analyst is in how you have estimated your regression:
The REGRESS command in SAPS is just Ordinary Least Squares. You should recall from when you did my Econometrics class that OLS estimates of the parameters will be biased even in large samples unless the right-hand side variables are exogenous. Here this means that the right-hand-side variables 13 must be determined independently of schooling choices so they are uncorrelated with the error term ε in your regression. In other words you require that E(ε i │P i , X i )=0. Is PROSCOL participation 
You used a + b + cX i + ε i as your estimate of the i'th household's schooling when it participates in PROSCOL, while you used a + cX i + ε i to estimate schooling if it does not participate. Thus the difference, b, is the gain from the program. However, in making this calculation you implicitly assumed that ε i was the same either way. In other words, you assumed that ε was independent of P."
Speedy now sees that the bias due to non-random program placement that Unbiased Statistica was worried about might also be messing up her estimate based on the regression model suggested by Tangential Economiste. "Does that mean that my results are way off the mark?" "Not necessarily," Chisquare replies, as he goes to his white board. "Let's write down an explicit equation for P, as, say:
where Z is a bunch of variables that include all the observed 'poverty proxies' used for PROSCOL targeting. Of course there will also be some purely random error term that influences participation; these are poverty proxies that are not in your data, and there will also have been 'mistakes' in selecting participants that also end up in this ν term. Notice too that this equation is linear, yet P can only take two possible values, 0 and 1. Predicted values between zero and one are OK, but a linear model cannot rule out the possibility of negative predicted values, or values over one. There are nonlinear models that can deal with this problem, but to simplify the discussion I will confine attention for now to linear models. 14 "Now, there is a special case in which your OLS regression of S on P and X will give you an unbiased estimate of b. That is when X includes all the variables in Z that also influence schooling, and the error term ν is uncorrelated with the error term ε in your regression for schooling. This is sometimes called 'selection on observables' in the evaluation literature." "Why does that eliminate the bias?" asks Speedy.
"Well, you think about it. Suppose that the control variables X in your regression for schooling include all the observed variables Z that influence participation P and ν is uncorrelated with ε (so that the unobserved variables affecting program placement do not influence schooling conditional on X). Then you have eliminated any possibility of P being correlated with ε. It will now be exogenous in your regression for schooling.
"To put it another way, Ms Analyst, the key idea of selection on observables is that there is some observable X such that the bias vanishes conditional on X." "Why did it make such a difference when I added the control variables to my regression of schooling on PROSCOL participation?" "Because your X must include variables that were amongst the poverty proxies used for targeting, or were correlated with them, and they are variables that also influenced schooling."
Speedy learns about better methods of forming a comparison group
Next Speedy tells Chisquare about her first attempt at estimating the benefits. "How might I form a better comparison group?" "You want to compare schooling levels conditional on observed characteristics. Imagine that you divide the sample into groups of families with the same or similar values of X and you then compare the conditional means for PROSCOL and non-PROSCOL families. If schooling in the absence of the program is independent of participation, given X, then the comparison will give an 15 unbiased estimate of PROSCOL's impact. This is sometimes called 'conditional independence', and it is the key assumption made by all comparison-group methods." Speedy tries to summarize. "So a better way to select my comparison group, given the data I have, is to use as a control for each participant, a non-participant with the same observed characteristics. But that would surely be very hard Professor, since I could have a lot of those variables. There may be nobody amongst the non-participants with exactly the same values of all the observed characteristics for any one of the PROSCOL participants" "Ah", says Chisquare, "some clever statisticians have figured out how you can simplify the problem greatly. Instead of aiming to assure that the matched control for each participant has exactly the same value of X, you can get the same result by matching on the predicted value of P, given X, which is called the propensity score of X. You should read the papers by Rosenbaum and Rubin on the list I prepared for you. Their Biometrika 1983 paper shows that if (in your case) schooling without PROSCOL is independent of participation given X then it is also independent of participation given the propensity score of X. Since the propensity score is just one number, it is far easier to control for it than X, which could be many variables as you say. And yet propensity score matching is sufficient to eliminate the bias provided there is conditional independence given X." "Let me see if I understand you, Professor. I first regress P on X to get the predicted value of P for each possible value of X, which I then estimate for my whole sample. For each participant, I then find the non-participant with the closest value of this predicted probability. The difference in schooling is then the estimated gain from the program for that participant." "That is right, Ms Analyst. You can then take the mean of all those differences to estimate the impact. Or you can take the mean for different income groups, say. And notice that you don't need to assume that the impact is a linear function of the observables, as we were doing when talking about the regression methods. But you have to be careful with how you estimate the model of participation. A linear model for that purpose could give you crazy predicted probabilities, above 16 one, or negative. It is better to use the LOGIT command in SAPS. This assumes that the error term ν in the participation equation has a logistic distribution, and estimates the parameters consistent with that assumption by maximum likelihood methods. You remember my class on maximum likelihood estimation of binary response models don't you Ms Analyst?" "Yes, I do", says Speedy, as convincingly as she can.
"Another issue you should be aware of Ms Analyst is that some of the non-participants may have to be excluded as potential matches right from the start. There will of course be some nonparticipants who are ineligible according to the official eligibility rules, though they may nonetheless participate, so be very careful about choosing a comparison group that way. However, some families will have observable characteristics that make participation very unlikely. Indeed, you might find that some of the non-participant sample has a lower propensity score than any of those in the treatment sample. This is a case of what is sometimes called 'lack of common support'. There are important recent results in the literature indicating that failure to compare participants and controls at common values of matching variables is a major source of bias in evaluations. See the Heckman et al. (1998) paper on my reading list. In forming your comparison group, you should eliminate those observations from the set of non-participants to assure that you are only comparing gains over the same range of propensity scores. You should certainly exclude those non-participants for whom the probability of participating is zero. It is probably also a good idea to trim a little, say 2%, of the sample from the top and bottom of the non-participant distribution in terms of the propensity scores. Once you have identified participants and non-participants over a common matching region, I recommend you take an average of (say) the five or so nearest neighbors in terms of the absolute difference in propensity scores." "What should I include in X?" Speedy asks.
"Well clearly you should include all the variables in your data set that are, or could proxy for, the exogenous poverty indicators that were used by MSD in selecting PROSCOL participants. So again X should include the variables in Z. Notice also that you don't want any X's that were affected by the program. You might focus solely on variables that were measured prior to joining the program, or are unlikely to have changed. But that is not always clear; some characteristic might have changed in anticipation of becoming eligible for the program. Also note that, in principle, a different X will yield a different estimate of impact. You should check robustness. Choosing the X's is a weak spot of propensity score matching."
Speedy prepares a note summarizing the steps she needs to follow in doing propensity score matching.
Troublesome, and not so troublesome, unobservables "I now have a much better idea of how to form the comparison group, Professor Chisquare.
This should give me a much better estimate of the programs' impact." "Ah, there is no guarantee of that. Recall my warning that all these methods I have described to you so far will only eliminate the bias if there is conditional mean independence, such that the unobservable determinants of schooling-not included in your set of control variables X-are uncorrelated with program placement after conditioning on X. There are two distinct sources of bias, that due to differences in observables, as we have discussed, and that due to differences in unobservables; the latter is often called 'selection bias'." (See Speedy's notes.)
Chisquare points to his last equation. "Clearly conditional independence will hold if P is exogenous, for then E(ε i │X i , P i ) = 0. However, endogenous program placement due to purposive targeting based on unobservables will leave a bias. This is sometimes called 'selection on "That is not quite right, Ms Analyst. The regression method of Ms Economiste assumes that the unobservables are uncorrelated with the X's. This is not required for score matching, which allows you to control for heterogeneity in observables that are endogenous to outcomes (though exogenous to participation). Notice, however, that matching does not necessarily reduce the bias.
Matching eliminates part of the bias in your first naïve estimate of PROSCOL's impact. That leaves the bias due to any troublesome unobservables. However, these two sources of bias could be offsetting, one positive the other negative. Heckman et al. (1998) make this point. So the matching estimate could well have more bias than the naïve estimate."
Speedy regrets that a baseline survey was not done
Speedy is starting to feel more than a little desperate. "Is there any method besides randomization that is robust to these troublesome unobservables?" she asks the Professor.
"There is something you can do if you have 'baseline data' for both the participants and nonparticipants, collected before PROSCOL started. The idea is that you collect data on outcomes and their determinants both before and after the program is introduced, and you collect that data for an untreated comparison group as well as the treatment group. Then you can just subtract the difference between the schooling of participants and the comparison group before the program is introduced from the difference after the program. This is called the 'double difference' estimate, or just 'double diff' by people who like to abbreviate things. This will deal with the troublesome unobserved variables provided they do not vary over time."
Chisquare turns to his whiteboard again pointing to one of his earlier equations. "To see how this works, let's add time subscripts, so schooling after the program is introduced is:
Before the program, in the baseline survey, school attainment is instead:
S iB = a + cX iB + ε iB (Of course P=0 before the program is introduced.) The error terms include an additive time invariant effect, so we can write them as:
where η i is the time invariant effect, which is allowed to be correlated with P i , and µ it is an innovation error, which is not correlated with P i (or X i ).
"The essential idea here is to use the baseline data to reveal those troublesome unobservables. Notice that since the baseline survey is for the same households as you have now, the i'th household in the equation for S iA is the same household as the i'th in the equation for S iB . You can then take the difference between the 'after' equation and the 'before' equation; you get: indicator are influenced by the initial conditions. Then one will also want to control for differences in initial conditions. You can do this simply by adding X A and X B in the regression separately, so that the regression takes the form:
So even if some (or all) variables in X do not vary over time one can still allow X to affect the changes over time in schooling.
"The propensity-score matching method that I told you about can help assure that the comparison group is similar to the treatment group before you do the double difference. In an interesting study of an American employment program, it was found that failure to assure that comparisons were made in a region of common support was a major source of bias in the double difference estimate when compared to a randomized control group. Within the region of common support, however, the bias conditional on X did not vary much over time. So taking the double difference makes sense, after the matching is done. See the paper by Heckman et al., in Econometrica 1998 on my reading list." Speedy has had some experience doing surveys, and is worried about this idea of following up households. "When doing the follow-up survey, it must not be easy to find all those households 21 who were originally included in the baseline survey. Some people in the baseline survey may not want to be interviewed again, or they have moved to an unknown location. Is that a problem?" "If the drop outs are purely random then the follow up survey will still be representative of the same population in the baseline survey. However, if there is some systematic tendency for people with certain characteristics to drop out of the sample then there will be a problem. This is called 'attrition bias'. For example, PROSCOL might help some poor families move into better housing. And even when participant selection was solely based on information available at or around the baseline date (the time-invariant effect η i ), selected participants may well drop out voluntarily on the basis of changes after that date. Such attrition from the treatment group will clearly bias a doubledifference estimate of the program's impact."
Later Speedy writes up some notes about forming a double-difference estimate (Appendix).
Chisquare reminds Speedy about instrumental variables
"Double difference is neat, Professor Chisquare. But I don't have a baseline survey of the same households. I don't think anyone thought PROSCOL would have to be evaluated when they started the program. Is there anything else I can do to get an estimate that is robust to the troublesome unobservables?" "What you then need is an instrumental variable (IV)" he tells Speedy. "You must surely recall from my classes that this is the classic solution for the problem of an endogenous regressor." "Can you just remind me, Professor Chisquare?" "An instrumental variable is really just some observable source of exogenous variation in program participation. In other words, it is correlated with P but is not already in the regression for schooling, and is not correlated with the error term in the schooling equation, ε. So you must have at least one variable in Z that is not in X, and is not correlated with ε. Then the Instrumental Variables Estimate of the program's impact is obtained by replacing P by its predicted value conditional on Z.
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Since this predicted value depends solely on Z (which is exogenous) and Z is uncorrelated with ε, it is now reasonable to apply ordinary least squares to this new regression." "I see," says Speedy. "Since the predicted values depend only on the exogenous variation due to the instrumental variable, and the other exogenous variables, the unobservables are no longer troublesome, since they will be uncorrelated with the error term in the schooling regression." "You've got it Ms Analyst. That also suggests another way you can deal with the problem. "An IV can also help if you think there is appreciable measurement error in your program participation data. This is another possible source of bias. Measurement error means that you think that program participation varies more than it actually does. If the measurement error is randomhere meaning that it has zero mean and is not correlated with observed or unobserved determinants of schooling -then your estimate of the program's impact will be biased toward zero, and the larger the variance of the measurement error the greater the bias." 23 "Yes, you called that 'attenuation bias' in your class, as I recall, because this bias attenuates the estimated regression coefficient, pushing it toward zero." "However, if you had a dependent variable that could only take two possible values, at school or not at school say, then you should use a nonlinear binary response model, such as Logit or Probit.
The principle of testing for exogeneity of program participation is similar in this case. There is a paper by Rivers and Vuong (1988) that discusses the problem for such models; Blundell and Smith 
Speedy returns to her computer
Speedy is starting to wonder whether this will ever end. "I'm learning a lot, but what am I going to tell my boss?" Speedy tries to think of an instrumental variable. But every possibility she can think of could just as well be put in with the variables in X. She now remembers Professor Chisquare's class; her problem is finding a valid "exclusion restriction", which justifies putting some variable in the equation for participation, but not in the equation for schooling. Speedy decides to try the "propensity score matching method" suggested by Chisquare. Her logit model of participation looks quite sensible, and suggests that PROSCOL is well targeted.
(Virtually all of the variables that she would expect to be associated with poverty have positive, and significant, coefficients.) This is interesting in its own right. She then does the propensity score matching just as Professor Chisquare has advised her. On comparing the mean school enrollment 24 rates, Speedy finds that kids of the matched comparison group had an enrollment rate of 60%, as compared to the figure of 80% for PROSCOL families.
She now thinks back on those comments that Ms Tangential Economiste had made about foregone income. She finds that the Bureau of Statistics did a special survey of child labor that asked about earnings. (There is an official ban on kids working before they are 16 years of age in Labas, but the government has a hard time enforcing it; nonetheless, child wages are a sensitive issue.)
From this she can figure out what earnings a child would have had if she had not gone to school.
So Speedy can now subtract from PROSCOL's cash payment to participants the amount of foregone income, and so work out the net income transfer. Subtracting this net transfer from total income, she can now work out where the PROSCOL participants come from in the distribution of pre-intervention income. They are not quite as poor as she had first thought (ignoring foregone income) but they are still poor; for example, two-thirds of them are below Labas' official poverty line.
Having calculated the net income gain to all participants, Speedy can now calculate the poverty rate with and without PROSCOL. The "post-intervention" poverty rate (with the program) is just the proportion of the population living in households with an income per person below the poverty line, where "income" is the observed income (including the gross transfer receipts from PROSCOL). This she calculates directly from the LSS. By subtracting the net income gain (cash transfer from PROSCOL minus foregone income from kids' work) attributed to PROSCOL from all the observed incomes she gets a new distribution of pre-intervention incomes. The poverty rate without the program is then the proportion of people living in poor households, based on this new distribution. Speedy finds that the observed poverty rate in Northwest Labas of 32% would have been 36% if PROSCOL had not existed. The program allows 4% of the population to escape poverty now. The schooling gains mean that there will also be both pecuniary and non-pecuniary gains to the poor in the future. 25 Speedy also recognizes that there is some uncertainty about the LBS poverty line. So she repeats this calculation over a wide range of poverty lines. She finds that at a poverty line for which 50% of the population are poor based on the observed post-intervention incomes, the proportion would have been 52% without PROSCOL. At a poverty line which 15% fail to reach with the program, the proportion would have been 19% without it. By repeating these calculations over the whole range of incomes, Speedy realizes that she has traced out the entire "poverty incidence curves" 
A chance encounter with Ms Sensible Sociologist
The day before she is due to present her results to her boss, Speedy accidentally bumps into "The trouble is that the LSS did not ask about child labor. That is in another LBS survey. I think what I will do is present the results with and without the deduction for foregone income." "That might be wise" says Sensible Sociologist. "Another thing I have noticed Speedy is that, for a poor family to get on PROSCOL it matters a lot which school-board area the family lives in.
All school areas (SBA) get a PROSCOL allocation from the center, even SBAs that have very few poor families. If you are poor but living in a well-to-do SBA you are more likely to get help from PROSCOL than if you live in a poor SBA. The authorities like to let all areas participate for political reasons. As a result, it is relative poverty-relative to others in the area you live-that matters much more than your absolute level of living."
"No I did not know that", replies Speedy, a little embarrassed that she had not thought of talking to Sensible Sociologist earlier, since this could be important.
"That gives me an idea, Sense. I know which school-board area each household belongs to in the LBS survey, and I know how much the center has allocated to each SBA. Given what you have told me, that allocation would influence participation in PROSCOL, but one would not expect it to matter to school attendance, which would depend more on one's absolute level of living, family circumstances, and I guess characteristics of the school. So the PROSCOL budget allocation across SBA's can be used as instrumental variables to remove the bias in my estimates of program impact. " Sensible Sociologist's eyes roll again, as Speedy says farewell and races back to her office.
She first looks into the original file she was given, to see what rules are used by the center in allocating PROSCOL funds across SBAs. A memo from the Ministry indicates that allocations are based on the number of school age children, with an "adjustment factor" for how poor the SBA is thought to be. However, the rule is somewhat vague.
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Speedy re-runs her regression for schooling. But now she replaces the actual PROSCOL participation by its predicted value (the propensity score) from the regression for participation, which now includes the budget allocation to the SBS. However, she is worried about the possibility that the allocation of the PROSCOL budget might be correlated with omitted determinants of schooling in her model, notably characteristics of the school. Although school characteristics do not appear to matter officially to how PROSCOL resources are allocated, she worries that unofficially they may matter.
"Any omitted school characteristics that jointly influence PROSCOL allocations by SBA and individual schooling outcomes will leave a bias in my IV estimates", Speedy says to herself. She realizes that her only protection against that problem with the data she has is to add as many school characteristics as possible to her regression for attendance. But she also realizes that she can never rule out the possibility of bias. An influential school principal, for example, might simultaneously attract PROSCOL and achieve better outcomes for the students in other ways. She cannot measure the political clout of the principal. But with plenty of geographic control variables, Speedy thinks that this method should at least offer a credible alternative to compare with her matching estimate.
Soon she has the results. Consistent with Sense's observations, the budget allocation to the SBA has a significant positive coefficient in the logit regression for PROSCOL participation. Now (predicted) PROSCOL participation is significant in a regression for school enrolment, in which she includes all the same variables from the logit regression, except the SBA budget allocation. The coefficient implies that the enrollment rate is 15 percentage points higher for PROSCOL participants than would have otherwise been the case. She also runs regressions for years of schooling, for boys and girls separately. For either boys or girls of 18 years, her results indicate that they would have dropped out of school almost two years earlier if it had not been for PROSCOL.
Speedy wonders what Professor Chisquare will think of this. She is sure he will find something questionable about her methods. "I wonder if I am using the right standard errors? And 28 should I be using linear models?" Speedy decides she will order that new program FEM (Fancy Econometric Methods) that she has heard about. But that will have to wait. For now, Speedy is happy that her results are not very different from those she got using the propensity-score matching method. And she is re-assured somewhat by Sense's comments based on her observations in the field. "They can't all be wrong".
Speedy reports back to her boss
Speedy writes up her results and gives the report to Mr. Undersecretary. He seems quite satisfied. "So PROSCOL is doing quite well." Mr. Undersecretary arranges a meeting with the Minister, and he asks Speedy to attend. The Minister is interested in Speedy's results, and asks some questions about how she figured out the benefits from PROSCOL. He seems to appreciate Speedy's efforts to assure that the comparison group is similar to PROSCOL families. "I think we should expand PROSCOL to include the rest of Labas," the Minister concludes. "We will not be able to do it all in one go, but over about two years I think we could cover the whole country. But I want you to keep monitoring the program Speedy." "I would like to do that, Minister. However, I have learnt a few things about these evaluations. I would recommend that you randomly exclude some eligible PROSCOL families in the rest of Labas. We could then do a follow up survey of both the actual participants and those randomly excluded from participating. That would give us a more precise estimate of the benefits, However, Speedy has also learnt that rigorous impact evaluation is much more difficult than she first thought, and one can sometimes obtain a worryingly wide range of estimates, depending on the specifics of the methodology used. Chisquare's advice remains valuable in suggesting alternative methods in the frequent situations of less than ideal data, and pointing out the pitfalls. Speedy has also learnt to be eclectic about data.
The Finance Minister did eventually convince the Minister of Social Development to randomize the first tranche allocation of PROSCOL II across school board areas in the rest of Labas, and this helped Speedy identify the program's impact. Her analysis of the new question on child labor added to the LBS survey revealed that there was some foregone income from PROSCOL, though not quite as much as she had first thought.
Tangential Economiste made a further comment on Speedy's first report on PROSCOL, to the effect that Speedy could also measure the future income gains from PROSCOL, using recent work by labor economists on the returns to schooling in Labas. When Speedy factored this into her calculations, PROSCOL was found to have quite a reasonable economic rate of return, on top of the fact that the benefits were reaching the poor. She found that this calculation was somewhat sensitive to the discount rate used for working out the present value of the future income gains.
One big difference from her first PROSCOL evaluation is that Speedy now spends a lot more time understanding how each program works before doing any number crunching. And she spreads the evaluation over a much longer period, often including baseline and multiple follow-up surveys of the same households. 31 However, everything has not gone smoothly. At first she had a lot of trouble getting the relevant line ministries to cooperate with her. It is often hard to get them to define the objectives of each program she is evaluating; Speedy sometimes thinks that getting the relevant line ministry to define the objectives of its public spending is an important contribution in its own right. But eventually the line Ministries realize that they can learn a lot from these evaluations, and that they were being taken seriously by the Finance Minister.
Internal politics within the government is often a problem. Thankfully the data side is now • It helps a lot to have a firm grip on the relevant "stylized facts" about the setting. The relevant facts might include the poverty map, the way the labor market works, the major ethnic divisions, other relevant public programs, etc.
• Be eclectic about data. Sources can embrace both informal, unstructured, interviews with participants in the program as well as quantitative data from representative samples.
• However, it is extremely difficult to ask counter-factual questions in interviews or focus groups; try asking someone who is currently participating in a public program: "what would you be doing now if this program did not exist?" Talking to program participants can be valuable, but it is unlikely to provide a credible evaluation on its own.
• One also needs data on the outcome indicators and relevant explanatory variables. You need the latter to deal with heterogeneity in outcomes conditional on program participation. Outcomes can differ depending on whether one is educated, say. It may not be possible to see the impact of the program unless one controls for that heterogeneity.
• You might also need data on variables that influence participation but do not influence outcomes given participation. These instrumental variables can be valuable in sorting out the likely causal effects of non-random programs.
• The data on outcomes and other relevant explanatory variables can be either quantitative or qualitative. But it has to be possible to organize it in some sort of systematic data structure. A simple and common example is that one has values of various variables including one or more outcome indicators for various observation units (individuals, households, firms, communities).
• The variables one has data on and the observation units one uses are often chosen as part of the evaluation method. These choices should be anchored to the prior knowledge about the program (its objectives of course, but also how it is run) and the setting in which it is introduced.
• The specific source of the data on outcomes and their determinants, including program participation, typically comes from survey data of some sort. The observation unit could be the household, firm, geographic area, depending on the type of program one is studying.
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• Survey data can often be supplemented with useful other data on the program (such as from the project monitoring data base) or setting (such as from geographic data bases).
Sources of bias
A naïve estimate of a program's impact is to compare the relevant outcome indicators between participants and non-participants. This estimate will be biased if there is a difference between these two groups in outcomes without the intervention. This can be broken down into two sources of bias:
• Bias due to differences in observable characteristics. This can come about in two ways. • Bias due to differences in unobservables. The term "selection bias" is sometimes confined solely to this component (though some authors use that term for the total bias in a non-experimental evaluation). This source of bias arises when, for given values of X, there is a systematic relationship between program participation and outcomes in the absence of the program. In other words, there are unobserved variables that jointly influence schooling and program participation conditional on the observed variables in the data.
There is nothing to guarantee that these two sources of bias will work in the same direction. So eliminating either one of them on its own does not mean that the total bias is reduced in absolute value. That is an empirical question. In one of the few studies to address this question, the true impact, as measured by a well-designed experiment, was compared to various non-experimental estimates (Heckman et al., 1998) . The bias in the naïve estimate was huge, but careful matching of the comparison group based on observables greatly reduced the bias.
Methods for evaluating impact
Various methods exist to reduce the bias in a naïve estimate. The essential problem these methods address is that we do not observe the outcomes for participants if they had not participated.
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So evaluation is essentially a problem of missing data. A "comparison group" is used to identify the counter-factual of what would have happened without the program. The comparison group is designed to be very similar to the "treatment group" of participants with one key difference: the comparison group did not participate. The main methods available are as follows:
• Randomization, in which the selection into the treatment and comparison groups is random in some well-defined set of people. Then there will be no difference on average between the two groups besides the fact that the treatment group got the program.
• Matching. Here one tries to pick an ideal comparison group from a larger survey. The comparison group is matched to the treatment group on the basis of a set of observed characteristics, or using the "propensity score" (predicted probability of participation given observed characteristics), discussed further below. A good comparison group comes from the same economic environment as the treatment group, and was administered the same questionnaire by similarly trained interviewers.
• Double difference (or "difference in difference") methods. Here one compares a treatment and comparison group (first difference), before and after a program (second difference). Comparators should be dropped if they have propensity scores outside the range observed for the treatment group. (A special case is a "reflexive comparison" which only compares the treatment group before and after the intervention; since there is no control group this method can be deceptive as a basis for assessing impact.)
• Instrumental variables methods. Instrumental variables are variables that matter to participation, but not to outcomes given participation. If such variables exist then they identify a source of exogenous variation in outcomes attributable to the program -recognizing that its placement is not random but purposive. The instrumental variables are first used to predict program participation, then one sees how the outcome indicator varies with the predicted values, conditional on other characteristics.
Steps in propensity score matching
The aim of matching is to find the closest comparison group from a sample of nonparticipants to the sample of program participants. "Closest" is measured in terms of observable characteristics. If there are only one or two such characteristics then matching should be easy. But typically there are many potential characteristics. This is where propensity score matching comes in.
The main steps in matching based on propensity scores are as follows:
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Step 1: You need a representative sample survey of eligible non-participants as well as one for the participants. The larger the sample of eligible non-participants the better, to facilitate good matching.
If the two samples come from different surveys, then they should be highly comparable surveys (same questionnaire, same interviewers or interviewer training, same survey period and so on).
Step 2: Pool the two samples and estimate a logit model of program participation as a function of all the variables in the data that are likely to determine participation.
Step 3: Create the predicted values of the probability of participation from the logit regression; these are called the "propensity scores". You will have a propensity score for every sampled participant and non-participant.
Step 4: Some of the non-participant sample may have to be excluded at the outset because they have a propensity score which is outside the range (typically too low) found for the treatment sample. The range of propensity scores estimated for the treatment group should correspond closely to that for the retained sub-sample of non-participants. You may also want to restrict potential matches in other ways, depending on the setting. For example, you may want to only allow matches within the same geographic area to help assure that the matches come from the same economic environment.
Step 5: For each individual in the treatment sample, you now want to find the observation in the nonparticipant sample that has the closest propensity score, as measured by the absolute difference in scores. This is called the "nearest neighbor". You will get more precise estimates if you use the nearest five neighbors (say).
Step 6: Calculate the mean value of the outcome indicator (or each of the indicators if there is more than one) for the five nearest neighbors. The difference between that mean and the actual value for the treated observation is the estimate of the gain due to the program for that observation.
Step 7: Calculate the mean of these individual gains to obtain the average overall gain. This can be stratified by some variable of interest such as incomes in the non-participant sample. This is the simplest form of propensity score matching. Complications can arise in practice.
For example, if there is over-sampling of participants then you can use choice-based sampling methods to correct for this (Manski and Lerman, 1978) ; alternatively you can use the odds ratio (p/(1-p), where p is the propensity score) for matching. Instead of relying on the nearest neighbor you can instead use all the non-participants as potential matches but weight them differently, according to how close they are (Heckman et al., 1998) . 36 
Doing a double difference
The "double difference" method entails comparing a treatment group with a comparison group (as might ideally be determined by the score matching method described above) both before and after the intervention. The main steps are as follows:
Step 1: You need a "baseline" survey before the intervention is in place, and the survey must cover both non-participants and participants. If you do not know who will participate, you have to make an informed guess. Talk to the program administrators.
Step 2: You then need one or more follow-up surveys, after the program is put in place. These should be highly comparable to the baseline surveys (in terms of the questionnaire, the interviewing, etc). Ideally the follow-up surveys should be of the same sampled observations as the baseline survey. If this is not possible then they should be the same geographic clusters, or strata in terms of some other variable.
Step 3: Calculate the mean difference between the "after" and "before" values of the outcome indicator for each of the treatment and comparison groups.
Step 4: Calculate the difference between these two mean differences. That is your estimate of the impact of the program.
